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BEYOND FRACKING: HOW ROBINSON TOWNSHIP ALTERS 
PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPAL ZONING RIGHTS 
Christian C. Hagen-Frederiksen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 19, 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court released its 
opinion in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth,1 a highly-anticipated and 
hotly-debated decision regarding the balance between the ability of 
municipalities to ban hydraulic fracturing from its borders and 
Pennsylvania’s recently-passed Act 13 of 2012, which amended 
Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act.2 The decision marked a significant point in 
the history of hydraulic fracturing in the Commonwealth, a history that has 
been highlighted by significant amounts of debate and controversy. In the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s plurality opinion—the applicability of 
which has since been questioned by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 
Court3—Chief Justice Castille held that portions of Act 134 were in conflict 
with the Environmental Rights Amendment of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution5 and rendered the Commonwealth incapable of performing its 
“duty as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources.”6 
The significant depth of the opinion, questions of its lasting 
applicability as a plurality opinion, and its strengthening of article I, section 
                                                                                                                           
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. B.A., 2013, The Pennsylvania 
State University. Sincere appreciation and thanks to my parents, Nils and Mary, my brother, Alex, and 
to Sarah for all of their support, love, and guidance. Additional gratitude is owed to my legal writing 
professor, Nancy Burkoff, for her invaluable assistance in developing my writing abilities throughout 
law school. 
1 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
2 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301–3504 (2012). 
3 Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 159 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015). 
4 Specifically, sections 3215(b)(4), 3215(d), 3303, and 3304 of the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act 
were held to be unconstitutional by the plurality. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 985. 
5 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
6 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 985. 
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27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution all create an opinion where “the 
implications . . . will be felt for years, perhaps decades.”7 While the re-
establishment of article I, section 27, its nature as a plurality opinion, and 
its general negative effect on the hydraulic fracturing industry have been 
widely discussed elsewhere,8 the opinion also reaffirms existing powers and 
places new burdens on municipalities.9 Part II of this Note will provide an 
overview of the Robinson Township opinion and of the legal landscape of 
municipal zoning rights and responsibilities in Pennsylvania. Part III will 
discuss how Robinson Township altered those existing zoning rules. Part IV 
will discuss both the implications of this opinion beyond hydraulic 
fracturing and the subsequent legal activities stemming from Robinson 
Township. Part V will suggest a “hybrid” approach, encompassing several 
of the competing interests of the Commonwealth, its citizens, and 
municipalities. 
II. ROBINSON TOWNSHIP AND PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPAL ZONING LAW 
A. Act 13 and Robinson Township 
Governor Tom Corbett signed Pennsylvania Act 13 into law on 
February 14, 2012.10 The Act, among its provisions, “establishes a system 
for collecting impact fees [a levy imposed on drillers by the 
Commonwealth to offset the cost of drilling on the Commonwealth and 
local municipalities] from hydrofracturing,” and establishes or changes 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 John Dernbach, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Robinson Township Decision: A Step Back 
for Marcellus Shale, A Step Forward for Environmental Rights and the Public Trust, WIDENER ENVTL. 
L. CENTER BLOG (Dec. 21, 2013, 9:39 AM), http://blogs.law.widener.edu/envirolawcenter/2013/12/ 
21/the-pennsylvania-supreme-courts-robinson-township-decision-a-step-back-for-marcellus-shale-a-step 
-forward-for-article-i-section-27/. 
8 For greater depth on how the Robinson Township decision can affect the national perception of 
hydraulic fracturing see Joshua P. Fershee, Facts, Fiction, and Perception in Hydraulic Fracturing: 
Illuminating Act 13 and Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 
829 (2014). 
9 See also Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Local Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 
593 (2014) (providing a broader analysis of local regulation over hydraulic fracturing in a variety of 
states, including Pennsylvania). 
10 Act of Feb. 14, 2012, Pub. L. 87, No. 13 (codified at 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301–3504 
(2012)). 
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permit requirements for oil and gas operations in the state.11 Act 13 was 
brought about largely due to the then-emerging practice of extracting 
natural gas from the Marcellus Shale [natural formation] in Pennsylvania.12 
Marcellus Shale “is a sedimentary rock buried thousands of feet beneath . . . 
upstate New York south through Pennsylvania to West Virginia and west to 
parts of Ohio.”13 Although there are many shale formations throughout the 
world, Marcellus Shale is “thought to contain up to 10 percent of available 
natural gas deposits in North America,”14 and, as such, has been a hotbed 
for both development activity and concerns about the impact of 
development on the environment.15 Natural gas development has also 
become a hot-button political issue, especially over the prospect of natural 
gas development on public lands.16 As part of these development efforts, 
natural gas is typically extracted through hydraulic fracturing—pumping a 
mixture of sand, water and chemicals into the shale, causing fractures 
which allow the gas to escape—or through horizontal drilling.17 
Act 13 quickly became subject to legal challenges from various 
citizens’ groups and townships. In March 2012, several Pennsylvania 
citizens filed suit in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, arguing that 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 John C. Dernbach et al., Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Examination 
and Implications, 67 RUTGERS L. REV. 1169, 1172 (2015). 
12 Id. at 1171. 
13 The Marcellus Shale, Explained, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/ 
tag/marcellus-shale/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
14 Dernbach et al., supra note 11, at 1171. 
15 See Katharine Q. Seelye, Gas Boom Aids Pennsylvania, But Some Worry Over the Risk, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/us/hydraulic-fracturing-
brings-money-and-problems-to-pennsylvania.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1, for more information about 
Pennsylvanians’ concerns over the environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing. 
16 See Laura Legere, Gov. Wolf bans new leases for drilling on state lands, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Jan. 29, 2015, 12:34 PM), http://powersource.post-gazette.com/powersource/home-
powersource/2015/01/29/Governor-Wolf-signs-order-banning-new-gas-drilling-leases-on-Pennsylvania-
public-lands/stories/201501290301; Andrew McGill, Fracking opponents focusing on Allegheny County 
parks plan, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette 
.com/local/marcellusshale/2013/08/12/Fracking-opponents-focusing-on-Allegheny-County-parks-plan/ 
stories/201308120100; Donald Gilliland, Corbett opens state parks and forests to additional, restricted 
drilling, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS (May 23, 2014, 6:11 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/ 
index.ssf/2014/05/corbett_opens_state_parks_and.html (providing examples of municipalities and the 
Commonwealth both opening and closing state and municipal lands for natural gas development). 
17 For more information on the process of hydraulic fracturing see Natural Gas Extraction—
Hydraulic Fracturing, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/hydraulicfracturing 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
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the entirety of Act 13 was unconstitutional.18 On July 26, 2012, the 
Commonwealth Court determined that several portions of Act 13 were 
unconstitutional, specifically section 3215(b)(4), section 3304, and 
remaining portions of chapter 33 that enforced section 3304.19 Section 
3215(b)(4) stated that the Department of Environmental Protection must 
waive distance restrictions that would ordinarily prohibit disrupting areas 
within certain distances of water bodies as long as the permit applicant 
submits “a plan identifying additional measures . . . to be employed . . . 
necessary to protect the waters.”20 Section 3304 required that “all local 
ordinances regulating oil and gas operations shall allow for the reasonable 
development of oil and gas resources.”21 As part of section 3304’s 
reasonableness mandate, the statute “imposes uniform rules for 
hydrofracturing in the state, prohibits local governments from establishing 
more stringent rules, and establishes limited time periods for local review of 
drilling proposals.”22 
Following the Commonwealth Court’s decision, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania heard arguments and issued its decision on December 19, 
2013. The plurality opinion addresses the “justiciability” of the dispute23 
and the constitutionality of Act 13.24 The court determined that both 
landowners and municipalities had standing to challenge Act 13 stating that 
municipalities have “a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in 
protecting the environment and the quality of life within its borders, which 
interest confers . . . standing in a legal action to enforce environmental 
standards.”25 Because municipalities are “legal persons” and because 
environmental protection is an “essential aspect of Pennsylvanians’ quality 
of life,” the court determined that “[l]ocal government, therefore, has a 
substantial or direct interest in the outcome of litigation premised upon 
changes . . . which would alter the physical nature of the [municipality].”26 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 915–16 (Pa. 2013). 
19 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012); Robinson Twp., 83 
A.3d at 916. 
20 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(b)(4). 
21 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304(a). 
22 Dernbach et al., supra note 11, at 1172. 
23 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 916. 
24 Id. at 930. 
25 Id. at 919–20 (citing Susquehanna Cnty. v. Commonwealth, 458 A.2d 929, 931 (Pa. 1983)). 
26 Id. at 920. 
2016] BEYOND FRACKING 379 
 
Vol. 34, No. 2 (2016) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2016.101 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
More substantially, the court analyzed whether Act 13 was 
incompatible with article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (the 
Environmental Rights Amendment),27 Due Process under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution and U.S. Constitution,28 and article II, section 1 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.29 The court found that the case exceeded a mere 
zoning dispute; instead, it “center[ed] upon an asserted vindication of 
citizens’ rights to quality of life on their properties and in their 
hometowns.”30 In doing so, the court leaned heavily on the Environmental 
Rights Amendment, determining that the rights of citizens to clean air and 
water, as well as the requirement to preserve the “natural, scenic, historic 
and esthetic values of the environment” are on “presumptively” equal 
grounds to the other rights provided in the Pennsylvania Constitution.31 The 
amendment, which was implemented in 1971 following decades of 
degradation of Pennsylvania’s natural resources as a result of heavy 
industry, guaranteed the Commonwealth’s resources as the property of all 
people, then-current and future, of the state.32 Additionally, because natural 
resources are within the public trust of the Commonwealth, it is a “fiduciary 
obligated . . . to prevent and remedy the degradation, diminution, or 
depletion of our public natural resources.”33 As such, the Commonwealth is 
both prohibited from acting unreasonably in its Environmental Rights 
Amendment mandate, and required to “act affirmatively to protect the 
environment, via legislative action.”34 The court determined that because 
Act 13 grants industrial oil and gas operations the right to operate in “every 
zoning district of the Commonwealth, including in residential, commercial, 
and agricultural districts,” Act 13 “degrades the corpus of the trust” by 
prohibiting local governments from “mitigating the impact of oil and gas 
development at a local level.”35 The “sweeping import” of Act 13, the 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
28 PA. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
29 PA. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
30 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 942. 
31 Id. at 953. 
32 See Richard Rinaldi, After Lying Dormant for Decades, Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights 
Amendment Recently Received a Spark of Life from Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 24 
WIDENER L. REV. 436 (2015) (explaining further the history of the Environmental Rights Amendment). 
33 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 980. 
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degradation of that trust, and the “disparate impact on some citizens” make 
Act 13 “incompatible with the express command of the Environmental 
Rights Amendment,” and, as such, was unconstitutional.36 
B. Pennsylvania Zoning Law 
The Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code was created in 1968 
in part to “accomplish coordinated development; to guide uses of land, 
structures, streets, and public facilities; to promote preservation of natural 
and historic resources; to encourage revitalization of urban centers; to 
encourage consistency of comprehensive plans and land use regulations.”37 
The Code allows and lays out procedures for municipalities that wish to 
create planning commissions, comprehensive plans, official maps, 
subdivisions and land developments, municipal capital improvements, 
zoning, residential developments, neighborhoods, joint zones with other 
municipalities, zoning hearing boards, and appeals.38 
However, certain Commonwealth interests and activities have 
routinely come into conflict with the zoning desires of municipalities. In 
1976, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in City of Pittsburgh v. 
Commonwealth determined that Commonwealth activities—in this case, a 
pre-release center by the Bureau of Corrections—would be subject to local 
zoning regulations even when the activity is specifically authorized by 
legislative action.39 Although the Bureau of Corrections was permitted to 
establish these centers, the legislature directed that “whenever zoning 
regulations impose higher standards than are required in any other statute 
the zoning regulations shall govern.”40 Unless the legislature specifically 
intended to override local zoning regulations, local regulations govern.41 
In 1984, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that a 
state agency’s statutorily-granted plans for land usage are subject to the 
municipal zoning scheme, regardless of whether the zoning is for usage or 
                                                                                                                           
 
36 Id. at 982. 
37 Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code Quick Guide, GOVERNOR’S CENTER FOR LOC. 
GOV’T SERV. (Jan. 2003), available at http://mpc.landuselawinpa.com/MPC_quick_guide.pdf. 
38 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 10201–11202 (West 2016). 
39 City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 360 A.2d 607 (Pa. 1976). 
40 Id. at 613 (internal quotations omitted). 
41 Id. 
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for setback, height, or other similar restrictions.42 In Commonwealth Dep’t 
of General Services v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass’n, the Department of 
General Services sought to create a facility for mentally handicapped 
persons and filed the necessary permits with the City of Philadelphia to do 
so.43 The city denied the application on the grounds that the use of the 
building was barred in the zoning area and imposed a number of setback, 
height and other restrictions.44 The court clarified City of Pittsburgh, stating 
that statutes which grant eminent domain powers to state agencies are not 
indicators that state agencies can override local zoning regulations.45 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court engaged in a balancing test, weighing the 
frustration of the city’s zoning scheme with the potential frustration of the 
Commonwealth’s mandate to establish mental health facilities in its desired 
location. As such, the court determined that “in the case of a conflict 
between [an agency’s] land use plans and the zoning use regulatory scheme 
of [a municipality], the zoning scheme shall prevail.”46 
In 1993, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Olon v. Commonwealth 
Department of Corrections clarified that Ogontz only governed situations 
where there was no direct mandate by the legislature for an agency’s 
desired usage of a particular piece of property.47 In this case, the legislature 
“specified both the property to be acquired and the specific use of that 
property,” differentiating it from Ogontz and City of Pittsburgh.48 As such, 
the court determined that when the legislature either authorizes an agency 
to acquire unspecified property for a specified purpose or where an agency 
is authorized to acquire specific property for an unspecified purpose, the 
agency is subject to local zoning.49 In the case where specific property is to 
be used for a specific purpose, an agency may override local zoning.50 
In 1992, the Commonwealth Court confronted a case where local 
zoning went beyond merely regulating location and configuration through 
                                                                                                                           
 
42 Commonwealth Dep’t of Gen. Servs. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass’n, 483 A.2d 448 (Pa. 
1984). 
43 Id. at 449–50. 
44 Id. at 450. 
45 Id. at 454. 
46 Id. at 455. 
47 Olon v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Corrections, 626 A.2d 533 (Pa. 1993). 
48 Id. at 535. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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its zoning powers, but regulated the operation of coal mining activities.51 
There, where a township passed extensive amendments to its zoning 
ordinance regulating the operation of coal mining activities, the 
Commonwealth Court determined that the municipality’s zoning ordinance 
regulating operation was “more extensive than the traditional land use 
controls accomplished by zoning,” and were preempted by a state statute 
specifically regulating mining operations.52 In 2011, however, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified, stating that in a situation where a 
township zoning ordinance required mining activities to be set back from 
residences, the state statute governing operations does not preempt.53 In 
sum, municipalities may not govern operations through zoning if those 
operations are already regulated by state statute, but may require certain 
restrictions that do not regulate operations. 
III. ROBINSON TOWNSHIP’S ALTERATION OF THE LANDSCAPE 
Robinson Township adds a piece to this puzzle. Where section 3304 of 
Act 13 “permits industrial oil and gas operations as a use ‘of right’ in every 
zoning district throughout the Commonwealth,” the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court determined that the granting of that permission “degrades the corpus 
of the trust” between the Commonwealth and its citizens to protect the 
environment.54 Although sections 3303 and 3304 allow the Commonwealth 
to preempt local regulation and require local ordinances to allow for 
“reasonable development” of oil and gas,55 Act 13 does not provide the 
strict specificity of both property and purpose that existed in Olon. Even 
further, section 3304 restricts the ability of municipalities to “impose 
conditions, requirements or limitations . . . that are more stringent than 
[those] imposed on construction activities for other industrial uses,”56 and 
similarly restricts a municipality’s ability to impose extra regulations on 
                                                                                                                           
 
51 Pa. Coal Co. v. Twp. of Conemaugh, 612 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). 
52 Id. at 1093. 
53 Hoffman Mining Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 32 A.3d 587 (Pa. 2011). 
54 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 979–80 (Pa. 2013). 
55 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3303–04 (2012). 
56 Id. § 3304(b)(2). 
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“height of structures, screening and fencing, lighting or noise relating to 
permanent oil and gas operations.”57 
The strict restrictions on municipal authority to impose restrictions on 
oil and gas activities beyond those imposed on other industrial activities 
indicates that Act 13 seeks to alter municipal authority both towards typical 
zoning restrictions (setback, height, and other structural concerns) and the 
actual operations of the oil and gas activities. This would appear to be more 
similar to the Commonwealth Court’s Conemaugh decision on municipal 
regulations over the operation of an industrial activity. Act 13 appears to 
extend a similar series of specific regulations to oil and gas operations as 
the legislature did for coal mining operations at issue in Conemaugh. Act 
13, however, seems to venture more into the type of regulation in Hoffman 
Mining, where setback restrictions over mining activities were not 
preempted by state statute regulating operations.58 Section 3304 robs 
municipalities of the ability to determine that oil and gas operations may 
require different and potentially more stringent restrictions than those for 
other industrial activities. 
Justice Baer, who concurred with the plurality on due process grounds, 
paints zoning as fundamental to due process concerns of protecting a 
resident and his property from being harmed by other residents and their 
property.59 Because the authority of municipalities to zone is statutory, 
Justice Baer frames the question as whether the legislature can “remove en 
toto from local municipalities the apparatus it provided to vindicate the 
individual substantive due process rights of Pennsylvanian landowners?”60 
In his answer, he indicates that “once a state authorizes political 
subdivisions to zone for the best interests of the health, safety and character 
of their communities, and zoning ordinances are enacted and relied upon 
. . . the state may not alter or invalidate those ordinances, given their 
constitutional underpinning.”61 Regardless of whether the state has 
“compelling justification” for invalidating municipal authority to zone as it 
                                                                                                                           
 
57 Id. § 3304(b)(3). 
58 Hoffman Mining Co., 32 A.3d at 607. 
59 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1001–02 (Baer, J., concurring). 
60 Id. at 1002 (Baer, J., concurring). 
61 Id. at 1006 (Baer, J., concurring) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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pleases, the state may not override the zoning wishes of a municipality.62 In 
other words, Justice Baer seems to place paramount importance on 
maintaining the fidelity of municipalities to—after considering the unique 
needs of their individual communities—establish zones as they see fit in 
order to protect the constitutional right of its residents from being disturbed 
by other residents. 
The constitutional importance of due process and zoning—which 
appeared in the Commonwealth Court opinion but not in the plurality63—
adds interesting depth and power to the zoning rights of municipalities in 
relation to the state’s ability to supersede those zoning ordinances. Where 
Pennsylvania courts had in the past provided caveats to municipal zoning 
power—the balancing test in Ogontz, the specific mandate in Olon, the 
preemption over operations regulation in Conemaugh—the rationale 
employed by the Commonwealth Court and by Justice Baer in his 
concurrence would indicate that because local zoning was authorized by the 
legislature to weigh the needs of the community, it cannot be preempted by 
state statute regardless of whether the state’s goals are frustrated or the state 
specifically mandates a particular use. The opinion that municipalities 
should determine zoning is one with a fair bit of contention,64 and the 
notion that “local constituencies should enjoy broad powers of self-
government where the state legislature cannot reach a consensus about an 
issue” is advocated by at least one scholar.65 However, others feel as though 
other constitutional challenges (the Contracts Clauses, for example) possess 
the potential to have a stronger impact.66 
Additionally, the dissents of Justice Eakin and Justice Saylor are 
noteworthy. Justice Saylor views municipalities as “creatures of the General 
Assembly” and the General Assembly’s statutes as superior to municipal 
                                                                                                                           
 
62 Id. (Baer, J., concurring). 
63 Robinson Twp., 53 A.3d at 484–85. 
64 See Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd., 228 A.2d 169, 179 (Pa. 1967) (“The constitutionality of 
zoning ordinances which totally prohibit legitimate businesses . . . from an entire community should be 
regarded with particular circumspection . . . .”). 
65 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Hydrofracking and Home Rule: Defending and Defining an Anti-
Preemption Canon of Statutory Construction in New York, 77 ALB. L. REV. 647, 672 (2014) (providing 
an in-depth analysis on local control over hydraulic fracturing in New York state). 
66 Russell Bopp, Comment, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Lease Act 
and the Constitutionality of Forced Pooling, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 439, 461–62 (2014). 
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zoning.67 Justice Saylor criticizes the plurality’s decision to “completely 
redefine the role of municipalities relative to the sovereign,” and reaffirms 
his belief in the legislature’s authority to use its police power to “further 
both the economic and environmental interests of the Commonwealth and 
its citizens at large.”68 Justice Eakin’s dissent also rejects the argument that 
the zoning ability of municipalities is a constitutional right, stating that 
because the ability for municipalities to zone was originally granted by the 
legislature, the legislature reserves the ability to modify or remove that 
right.69 The dissents seem to echo the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Atkin v. Kansas, which determined that municipalities are “the creatures, 
mere political subdivisions, of the State for the purpose of exercising a part 
of its powers. They may exert only such powers as are expressly granted to 
them, or such may be necessarily implied from those granted.”70 Both 
dissents underscore a consistent belief: extraction of natural gas is a 
statewide concern better suited to the statewide legislature. As such, while 
municipal zoning has its time and place, natural gas extraction is not that 
time or place. 
Emerging since Robinson Township have been several cases which 
alter the potential application of the ruling. In ION Geophysical Corp. v. 
Hempfield Township, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania elected not to extend the Robinson Township 
holding to a case involving a township’s refusal to grant a permit allowing 
seismic testing by a private company within its borders.71 Although the 
court described Robinson Township as “significant,” because the portions of 
Act 13 addressed in Robinson Township never went into effect it “cannot 
presume that the Robinson Township case has any effect on Pennsylvania’s 
oil and gas laws enacted prior to Act 13, or that were not at issue in the 
case.”72 
The western district takes a very reserved view of Robinson Township, 
indicating that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion only affects Act 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1010. 
68 Id. at 1010–13. 
69 Id. at 1015. 
70 Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 220 (1903). 
71 ION Geophysical Corp. v. Hempfield Twp., No. 14-410, 2014 WL 1405397 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 
2014). 
72 Id. at *7. 
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13 itself, rather than expansively affecting a myriad of environmental, 
industrial and commercial activities through Article 27 and zoning due 
process. Because of this restrictive view of Robinson Township by the 
western district that “the extraction of oil and gas in the state of 
Pennsylvania is being legislated as a statewide issue,” local municipalities 
are “limited in regulating such activities, primarily . . . zoning.”73 The 
western district’s “take it or leave it” approach, quoting Eakins’ dissent that 
“the question [regarding natural gas extraction] is not ‘if’ this will happen 
but ‘how,’”74 only continues to demonstrate a narrow interpretation of 
Robinson Township. 
In 2014, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania determined that 
even given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Robinson Township holding, 
“section 3302 [of Act 13] remains operative.”75 Section 3302 supersedes 
“all local ordinances purporting to regulate oil and gas operations regulated 
by [Act 13],” with the exception of local ordinances adopted pursuant to the 
Municipalities Planning Code.76 In this case, the court determined that the 
challenged municipal ordinances were procedurally invalid and, as such, 
did not fall under Act 13 jurisdiction.77 As such, the Commonwealth 
Court’s reiteration that the portions of Act 13 which allow the 
Commonwealth to supersede local regulation over oil and gas is another 
blow towards the broad applicability of Robinson Township. 
Additionally, Robinson Township has been referenced when it comes 
to current industrial projects. In a 2014 review of a pending pipeline project 
before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (the “PUC”), Sunoco 
Pipeline, L.P. argued that environmental groups challenging the action 
needed to produce definitive evidence indicating environmental harm under 
section 27 and Robinson Township and, in the absence of such evidence, the 
PUC should deny the challenging groups’ preliminary objections.78 
Sunoco’s argument that Robinson Township’s Act 13 argument was 
irrelevant to Section 619 of the Municipal Planning Code and the PUC’s 
                                                                                                                           
 
73 Id. at *9. 
74 Id. (quoting Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1015). 
75 Seitel Data, Ltd. v. Center Twp., 92 A.3d 851 n.3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014). 
76 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2012). 
77 Seitel Data, 92 A.3d at 860–63. 
78 Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., No. P-2014-2411941, 2014 WL 5810345, *28 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
Oct. 2, 2014). 
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granting of Sunoco’s petition may go towards further weakening the 
applicability of Robinson Township, although a PUC adjudicatory hearing 
would likely be narrow.79 
The most significant post-Robinson Township decision was the 
Commonwealth Court’s January 2015 holding in Pennsylvania 
Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth.80 The 
Commonwealth Court expands greatly on the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s section 27 reasoning, engaging in a balancing test weighing the 
duties of the Commonwealth as trustee over the environment with its other 
duties.81 In doing so, it leans heavily on Payne v. Kassab (before both the 
Commonwealth Court in Payne I82 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 
Payne II83) which created the balancing test. The Payne I court weighed 
(1) compliance with applicable statutes and regulations relevant to the 
protection of public natural resources; (2) reasonable effort to keep 
environmental disruption to a minimum; and (3) the weight between the 
environmental harm at stake and the benefits derived.84 Although the 
Commonwealth Court notes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s plurality 
criticism of the Payne test in Robinson Township, the Commonwealth 
Court states that because Robinson Township is only a plurality, Payne I is 
still valid precedent with Payne II being useful to the balancing test 
analysis.85 Additionally, the Commonwealth Court’s decision challenging 
Robinson Township’s applicability brings further speculation that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court will be forced to take a second look at 
Robinson Township although it has denied doing so previously.86 Because 
of recent turnover in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a second look may 
bring a different opinion.87 In conclusion, the Commonwealth Court turns 
                                                                                                                           
 
79 Id. at *27. 
80 Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015). 
81 Id. at 157. 
82 Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) [hereinafter Payne I]. 
83 Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976) [hereinafter Payne II]. 
84 Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 158. Id. at *14 (quoting Payne I, 312 A.2d at 94). 
85 Id. at 159. 
86 See Marie Cusick, Pa. Supreme Court Will Not Reconsider Act 13 Decision, NAT’L. PUB. 
RADIO (Feb. 21, 2014), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2014/02/21/pa-supreme-court-will-not-
reconsider-act-13-decision/. 
87 See Andrew Bockis et al., Unanimous Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Rules that the 
Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Environmental Rights Amendment in Landmark Robinson Township 
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the Robinson Township plurality on its head, stripping it of much of its 
power until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court produces a majority opinion. 
Instead, the Payne test is resurrected, bringing with it an entirely different 
set of tools for the Commonwealth and its subdivisions. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ROBINSON TOWNSHIP’S ALTERATION OF THE 
ZONING LANDSCAPE 
Going beyond the clear implications of the Robinson Township 
decision on the future of oil and gas development, municipalities may 
attempt to use the decision’s plurality opinion or Justice Baer’s concurrence 
as ammunition to further regulate or block industrial or commercial 
activities, or activities by the Commonwealth. Whether it be oil and gas, 
heavy industry, mining or commercial activity, Robinson Township’s 
plurality and concurrence would seem to provide municipalities with a great 
deal of additional leeway—either through section 27 arguments or through 
due process zoning arguments—when it comes to regulating both business 
and government activities within their borders. 
A. Government Activities 
Looking back at the examples of municipal zoning cases previously 
discussed, a common theme emerges; frequently, the Commonwealth seeks 
to establish a facility within its control that is typically controversial, e.g. 
corrections, mental health, or medical facilities. In Ogontz, the 
Commonwealth sought to establish a mental health facility, and a 
neighborhood group objected to that usage in a residential zone.88 In City of 
Pittsburgh, a pre-release center for female inmates was challenged by the 
city.89 In Olon, the Commonwealth sought to renovate a former college into 
a correctional facility.90 While NIMBYism (“Not In My Backyard”) is a 
                                                                                                                           
 
Decision is Nonbinding, JDSUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ 
unanimous-pennsylvania-commonwealth-cour-50931/. 
88 Commonwealth Dep’t of Gen. Servs. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass’n, 483 A.2d 448 (Pa. 
1984). 
89 City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 360 A.2d 607 (Pa. 1976). 
90 Olon v. Commonwealth Dep’t of Corrections, 626 A.2d 533 (Pa. 1993). 
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common hurdle for these types of projects,91 under Olon the 
Commonwealth could maneuver around expected backlash by specifically 
and clearly expressing intent to override local zoning ordinances. 
Depending on the lower courts’ interpretation of the breadth of the 
Robinson Township opinion going forward, however, this power of the 
Commonwealth to circumvent local opposition to necessary facilities may 
be in jeopardy. 
Using the plurality opinion, a municipality may attempt, presumably at 
the behest of its residents, to use section 27 arguments justifying its zoning 
scheme to override the state’s desire to establish undesirable facilities. 
However, a municipality would be required in that scenario to demonstrate 
its actions are necessary to protect its residents’ “right to clean air, pure 
water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic 
values of the environment” required in section 27.92 In a scenario like Olon 
where a former college campus would be turned into a corrections facility, 
the municipality could conceivably make the argument that a campus’ 
natural aesthetics, landscaping and other features are assets to the public for 
recreation; as such, losing that space and having it become a state-operated 
corrections facility (which would by its nature be restricted from the public) 
may damage the natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the 
environment. If, however, the proposed location is like that in City of 
Pittsburgh, where the proposed facility is in an already-developed area 
likely without much open space to be preserved, the municipality may have 
a much weaker argument against the use of space by the state. 
A much broader position, though, would be for the municipality to 
argue, under Justice Baer’s concurrence, that due process necessitates that 
municipal zoning decisions not be usurped by the Commonwealth. Under 
Justice Baer’s rationale, a municipality whose zoning scheme is in conflict 
with a proposed usage by the Commonwealth—even if the usage is 
specifically and clearly detailed in a statute—would likely succeed in its 
attempt to regulate or restrict a particular Commonwealth usage. Because 
local control is so vital to maintaining the rights of residents to enjoy their 
own property without interference or injury from neighbors, municipal 
                                                                                                                           
 
91 See Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 496 (1994). 
92 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
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zoning inherently knows better than the Commonwealth concerning the 
particular needs and desires of an individual community. As such, if lower 
courts begin to adopt the kind of rationale used by Justice Baer in his 
concurrence, or if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopts this rationale in a 
subsequent case, it could become quite difficult for the Commonwealth to 
place its necessary (but unpopular) facilities in locations convenient to the 
individuals it serves. For example, if the Department of Corrections wishes 
to establish a new pre-release facility, it would likely wish to establish it in 
a location either nearby public transportation or within walking distance to 
job opportunities for the individuals. However, a great deal of locations 
meeting those criteria are likely populated by a number of residents who 
may oppose such a facility constructed close to their homes or businesses. 
If those residents are able to work with local authorities to establish a 
zoning scheme barring such a facility, the Commonwealth may be forced to 
build in a less ideal location, decreasing the overall effectiveness of its goal 
of rehabilitating inmates. 
The Payne I test applied by the Commonwealth Court in 
Environmental Defense Foundation would appear to be more of an 
environmental analysis than a due process analysis. Although the 
Commonwealth Court declined to extend the Robinson Township plurality, 
it makes no comment on the applicability or persuasiveness of Justice 
Baer’s concurrence, stating only that “[f]or our purposes, we find the 
plurality’s construction of article I, section 27 persuasive only to the extent 
it is consistent with binding precedent from this Court and the Supreme 
Court on the same subject.”93 As a result, it still seems as though the 
question of whether municipalities can challenge Act 13 and similar pieces 
of legislation on substantive due process grounds remains open. Applying 
the Payne I test to a challenged Commonwealth facility, a municipality 
would need to demonstrate that the action would result in environmental 
harm that outweighs the benefits of the usage.94 Similarly to the analysis 
used for the plurality, utilizing the Payne balancing test requires 
municipalities to demonstrate clear harm to the environment in addition to a 
failure by the Commonwealth to take reasonable precautions and a failure 
                                                                                                                           
 
93 Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 156 n.37 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015). 
94 Id. at 158. 
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to follow its own statutes and regulations. In short, where Justice Baer 
presumes that local municipalities know better about how to govern their 
communities, Payne I requires municipalities to demonstrate that the 
government actively violated its mandate as trustee. In all likelihood, 
municipalities who must satisfy Payne I are less likely to succeed in their 
claim than if they only needed to satisfy Robinson Township’s plurality or 
concurrence. 
B. Business and Industry 
The second practical application of Robinson Township is its effect on 
the ability of municipalities to regulate through zoning the businesses and 
industries within their borders. Just as there are certain Commonwealth 
facilities that could be considered undesirable, certain types of business or 
industry could also be considered undesirable for municipalities and 
residents. Whether the business produces excessive pollution, noise, traffic, 
or other characteristics that affect neighboring residents, a municipality 
could determine that it does not wish to have those types of businesses 
within its borders.95 Pieces of legislation like Act 13, however, restrict 
municipalities from differentiating between different industries, barring 
municipalities from “impos[ing] conditions, requirements or limitations . . . 
more stringent than conditions, requirements or limitations imposed on 
construction activities for other industrial uses.”96 
The legislature, forcing municipalities to treat all industrial uses as 
equal, takes from those municipalities the ability to make independent 
judgments on zoning according to the needs and desires of its residents. 
Such a policy could significantly affect commerce by restricting the ability 
for municipalities, for example, to focus its public outreach on bringing in a 
particular type of industry through its zoning scheme. If a municipality 
determines that due to strategic geographic position, the unique skills of its 
workforce, or for another specific purpose it wishes to attract a particular 
                                                                                                                           
 
95 See Michael Burger, The (Re)Federalization of Fracking Regulation, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1483, 1503 (2013) (stating that “the message these local bans send is clear: the increasing scale of 
operations and increasing risk of pollution and community impacts are a widespread concern in rural 
America”). 
96 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3304(b)(2) (2012). 
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type of industry to invest in the municipality by creating a new type of zone 
tailored to suit the needs of that industry’s operations, it could come under 
fire from a competing industry for its one-sided actions. The fear of legal 
challenge could prevent municipalities from attempting to attract industrial 
investment through zoning altogether, potentially crippling the commercial 
benefits of individual municipalities attempting to specialize in attracting 
specific industries. 
In a situation where a municipality wishes to restrict a private 
industrial usage, Robinson Township may not have much effect because Act 
13 specifically confronted the ability of municipalities to restrict oil and gas 
operations beyond those imposed on other industries. In the absence of a 
similar piece of legislation for a different industry, application of Robinson 
Township’s plurality to an issue where a municipality restricts an industry 
from establishing itself within their borders may prove difficult. On the 
other hand, Robinson Township also establishes the responsibility for 
municipalities to fulfill their duties in protecting the environment according 
to the mandate in article I, section 27, stating that “all existing branches and 
levels of government derive constitutional duties and obligations with 
respect to the people.”97 Professors Dernbach, May, and Kristl emphasize 
this stating “article I, section 27 challenges to local actions (such as zoning 
or other ordinances) or non-actions (such as the failure to have zoning or 
other ordinances) are theoretically possible.”98 The possibility of residents 
pursuing municipalities for failing to uphold their constitutional mandate of 
stewardship is a new option of potential relief for residents who disagree 
with their municipality. 
In an opposite scenario from the one in Robinson Township, where 
residents pursue an action against a municipality for failing to protect the 
environment by allowing certain industrial activities, residents would need 
to establish that the municipality failed to make reasonable decisions as 
trustee of the environment on behalf of its residents. This scenario, though, 
may run in conflict with Justice Baer’s concurrence, which puts great stock 
in the authority of municipalities to make zoning decisions.99 Although 
Justice Baer’s concurrence discusses that importance, disputes between 
                                                                                                                           
 
97 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 977 (Pa. 2013). 
98 Dernbach et al., supra note 11, at 1185. 
99 Id. at 1186–88. 
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residents and their municipalities over zoning decisions are not novel 
issues, and entire bodies of case law exist to resolve those disputes.100 
A court adopting Justice Baer’s interpretation would significantly alter 
the ability of the Commonwealth to issue legislation specifically permitting 
controversial commercial or industrial practices. Because of the 
controversial and politically-polarizing nature of hydraulic fracturing,101 
Justice Baer respects the legislature’s decision to “supersede some of the 
duties and responsibilities municipalities previously have exercised in 
related to land-use planning and the environment.”102 Similar to the 
Commonwealth’s specific legislation when establishing controversial 
facilities, the legislature may have determined that Act 13 was necessary to 
protect against each municipality individually banning natural gas 
extraction.103 Additionally, it should be noted, as has been indicated 
elsewhere,104 municipal governments are not above overly-provincial 
decision-making to the detriment of both residents and businesses. 
The Commonwealth Court’s analysis might also be relevant to a 
dispute between a municipality and its residents over industry in this new 
landscape. If a municipality restricts certain industry, industry groups or 
interested residents could claim that the municipality’s decision to restrict 
fails to fairly balance environmental harm with a derived benefit.105 
However, this may only be a plausible argument if the municipality restricts 
industry on environmental grounds; if, for example, the municipality is 
clear that its rationale for restricting industry has nothing to do with 
environmental concerns, there may be no recourse under Environmental 
Defense Foundation.106 
                                                                                                                           
 
100 See Hopewell Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, 452 A.2d 1337, 1341 (Pa. 1982) (holding that 
an ordinance must “bear a substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the 
community”). 
101 See generally Fershee, supra note 8 (discussing the controversy surrounding hydraulic 
fracturing). 
102 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1007 (Baer, J., concurring) (quoting Justice Saylor’s dissent). 
103 See Richardson, supra note 9, at 623 (comparing hydraulic fracturing to the construction of 
cellular towers, and advocating for a “substantial evidence” requirement for local land use decisions). 
104 See A First Take on Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, MCGUIRE WOODS LLP (Dec. 14, 
2013), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/sitecore/content/McGuire-Woods/Home/Client-Resources/ 
Alerts/2013/12/Robinson-Township-v-Commonwealth.aspx. 
105 Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 157 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015). 
106 Note, however, that the industry representatives or residents may be able to challenge such a 
zoning decision on other grounds. 
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The implications of Robinson Township and its subsequent 
proceedings are a mixture of significant change and unknown applicability. 
The opinion certainly appears to build from previous municipal zoning case 
law and has the potential to significantly affect Commonwealth agencies’ 
ability to create and operate their facilities in municipalities who oppose 
them. It also has the potential for residents, industry groups or 
municipalities to bring actions regarding municipal zoning decisions—
either in favor of new industry or restricting it. Additionally, the nature of 
the opinion’s diversity in its plurality, concurrence and two dissents create 
questions on its future applicability and scope, with one court already 
significantly narrowing its scope of applicability.107 
V. PROPOSING A HYBRID APPROACH 
Going forward, Pennsylvania courts will likely revisit the principles of 
Robinson Township to either bolster its plurality opinion or modify its 
holding in light of cases like Environmental Defense Foundation. Given the 
new composition of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court following the election 
of three new Democrat Justices,108 as well as the March 2016 resignation of 
another Justice,109 the adoption of a wholly new framework—and 
potentially a solid majority opinion—may occur with a second look. In 
March 2016, the newly-constituted Supreme Court heard new argument on 
Robinson Township.110 Following a 2014 Commonwealth Court ruling 
addressing multiple subsequent issues stemming from the original Robinson 
Township opinion, the Court heard argument on issues related to the 
notification requirements of private well owners by drillers, prohibition of 
medical professionals from disclosing oil and gas companies’ trade secrets, 
                                                                                                                           
 
107 See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 157. 
108 Chris Potter, Democrats Take Control of State Supreme Court, Win All 3 Open Seats, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 4, 2015, 1:02 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-
local/2015/11/03/Polls-open-at-7-a-m-in-Pennsylvania-voting-pittsburgh-election-day/stories/2015110 
30149. 
109 Angela Couloumbis, Craig R. McCoy & Mark Fazlollah, Amid porn email furor, Eakin 
resigns from high court, PHILA. ENQUIRER (Mar. 17, 2016), http://articles.philly.com/2016-03-17/ 
news/71576638_1_michael-eakin-supreme-court-ethics-case. 
110 Candy Woodall, ‘What makes it a public utility?’: Pa. Supreme Court hears arguments on oil 
and gas regulations, HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS (Mar. 9, 2016, 7:39 PM), http://www.pennlive.com/  
news/2016/03/what_makes_it_a_public_utility.html. 
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eminent domain concerns related to gas storage wells, and severability 
provisions in Act 13.111 Although the 2014 Commonwealth Court decision 
and March 2016 Supreme Court argument do not directly address the 
underlying holding of the Supreme Court’s 2013 Robinson Township 
decision or many of its underlying zoning implications,112 the lasting nature 
of the Robinson Township litigation demonstrates a near-constant evolution 
of the jurisprudence in both the Commonwealth Court and Supreme Court, 
making long-term predictability of Robinson Township’s application 
difficult. Going forward, Pennsylvania courts could adopt somewhat of a 
hybrid approach, encompassing an affirmation of Justice Baer’s emphasis 
on municipal zoning as a fundamental protector of procedural due process, 
a reaffirmation of the rights of Pennsylvania citizens and the mandate for 
the Commonwealth to maintain its natural resources, and an allowance for 
the Commonwealth to undertake its activities in strategic, efficient 
locations—even if those activities may be unpopular with the local 
population. 
Such an approach would still restrict the Commonwealth, under Justice 
Castille’s plurality, from “degrading [the] trust” of maintaining the 
Commonwealth’s natural resources through any of its actions in contrast 
with the Environmental Rights Amendment. The hybrid approach would 
also affirm Justice Baer’s belief in municipal zoning as a safeguard of 
procedural due process, as it would largely restrict the Commonwealth from 
interfering with duly enacted municipal zoning, and creates the assumption 
that municipal zoning is the purest voice of the peoples’ desires and 
interests. To combat the fear that the Commonwealth under this scheme 
would be unable—or at least would find it impractical—to undertake its 
necessary activities found to be societally unpopular, an exception would be 
created allowing the Commonwealth to establish and maintain necessary 
facilities like mental health, correctional, and other facilities with the onus 
on the Commonwealth to demonstrate that its chosen location is the most 
                                                                                                                           
 
111 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 96 A.3d 1104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014). 
112 Although zoning implications were not a primary matter of concern in the Commonwealth 
Court’s 2014 decision or in the Supreme Court’s 2016 argument, the Commonwealth Court does 
reference that “[l]ocal zoning matters will now be determined by the procedures set forth under the MPC 
and challenges to local ordinances that carry out a municipality’s constitutional environmental 
obligations,” and that sections 3305 and 3306 are not severable from the remainder of Act 13. Id. at 
1122. 
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practical and efficient. While such an exception may cause new litigation if 
the chosen municipality objects to the usage and slightly weakens Justice 
Baer’s approach, the hybrid approach balances the needs of the 
Commonwealth with the freedom of municipalities to act as they please, all 
while keeping the Commonwealth faithful to the Environmental Rights 
Amendment. 
The hybrid approach would be more restrictive than the 
Commonwealth Court’s Payne I test, which was affirmed by that court in 
Environmental Defense Foundation.113 Where the Commonwealth must 
demonstrate only a “reasonable effort to keep environmental disruption to a 
minimum” and balances the environmental harm with the economic 
benefit,114 the hybrid approach would take the restrictive view of mandating 
that the Commonwealth act as a steward of the Commonwealth’s natural 
resources and skews a balancing test much more towards environmental 
preservation. On the other hand, the hybrid approach may only address 
Commonwealth actions in contrast with the Environmental Rights 
Amendment, which would allow municipalities to weigh the costs and 
benefits of industrial development for themselves through zoning. While 
industry may likely object to this approach as it strips the Commonwealth’s 
ability to force objecting municipalities to consent to industrial 
development statewide, it still can perform its activities in friendly 
municipalities. 
In the case of hydrofracturing, the Commonwealth’s Act 13 would still 
fail this hybrid test and would allow municipalities who wish to have 
fracking between their borders to zone as such, while permitting 
municipalities who object to the practice to restrict it. While there may be 
difficulties in implementation—many energy companies sign leases with 
landowners to drill for natural gas years before they actually begin 
operations, presenting issues where a municipality later determines that it 
would not allow drilling through its zoning scheme and the question of 
whether municipalities are beholden to the Environmental Rights 
Amendment the same way the Commonwealth is—it may present the best 
approach for balancing the complicated issues stemming from 
                                                                                                                           
 
113 Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 157. 
114 Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976). 
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Pennsylvania’s large number of small, inter-connected, independent 
municipalities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Robinson Township opinion 
continues to pose significant questions regarding the future of 
environmental regulation in the Commonwealth. In addition, the plurality 
and particularly Justice Baer’s concurrence argue for a much stronger role 
for municipalities to zone as they see fit, even going so far as to indicate 
that municipal zoning is constitutionally necessary to protect the due 
process rights of residents. As the utilization and ramifications of Robinson 
Township continue to be realized both at the local level,115 the 
administrative level,116 in the appellate courts,117 and within industry,118 the 
emphasis on zoning rights has the potential to greatly increase the power of 
municipalities to permit, regulate, or restrict certain land uses within their 
borders. Through analyzing the Robinson Township opinion, Pennsylvania 
zoning law, and courts’ decisions subsequent to Robinson Township, we 
can attempt to accurately predict if and how municipalities’ zoning 
responsibilities are altered in this new landscape. 
                                                                                                                           
 
115 See Francesca Sacco, Judge Denies Robinson Township Residents’ Request for Stay in 
Drilling, OBSERVER-REP. (Jan. 5, 2015), available at http://www.observer-reporter.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20150105/NEWS01/150109752#.VMXY6CvF-So. 
116 See Harvilchuck v. Commonwealth, No. 2013-013-M, 2014 WL 4957400, *11 n.13 (Pa. Envtl. 
Hearing. Bd., Sept. 14, 2014) (referencing Robinson Township, but noting that petitioner could not make 
a section 27 challenge on procedural grounds). 
117 See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 157 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015). 
118 See MCGUIRE WOODS LLP, supra note 104, for an analysis on Robinson Township’s effect on 
the oil and gas industries. 
